Randomization of quantum states is the quantum analogue of the classical one-time pad. We present an improved, efficient construction of an approximately randomizing map that uses O(d/ǫ
Introduction

Encryption of quantum states
Randomization of quantum states is a procedure analogous to encryption of classical messages such as in the "one-time pad". Imagine that two parties wish to exchange sensitive data in the form of quantum states over an insecure quantum communication channel. They would like to encrypt the quantum data so that any eavesdropper with access to the channel will not gain any information about the data. The idea is to use a secret key, such as a uniformly random bit string, to transform a quantum state so that without access to the key, an adversary is unable to distinguish two different encrypted states, when averaged over the random choice of key. Equivalently, every state is mapped to the same mixed state by the encryption procedure. The encrypted state may then be sent over the insecure channel, and the receiver, who also knows the key may decrypt to recover the message.
It has been known for several years that applying an independently chosen random Pauli operator to each qubit of an n-qubit state maps it to the completely mixed state I/2 n . This gives rise to a scheme for perfect encryption of n-qubit quantum states with 2n secret uniformly random classical bits [6, 4] . This was also shown to be optimal in terms of the number of bits of key required [6, 4, 8, 12] .
The requirement of perfect encryption may be relaxed a little without compromising security, so that the encrypted states are all close to being completely mixed, rather than being exactly so. By using a probabilistic argument, Hayden, Leung, Shor, and Winter [7] showed that the number of bits of key required then drops by a factor of approximately 2: to approximately randomize n-qubit states to within ǫ of I/2 n (in trace norm), we need at most n + log n + 2 log 1 ǫ + O(1) bits of key. Subsequently, Ambainis and Smith [5] gave an efficient (quadratic time) scheme for approximate state randomization with respect to the trace norm using n + min 2 log n + 2 log 1 ǫ , log n + 3 log 1 ǫ + O (1) bits of key. Their construction is based on small-bias spaces (see, e.g., Ref. [11] ). They also showed how to reduce the key length to n + 2 log 1 ǫ at the cost of increasing the length of the ciphertext by 2n bits. The amount of key required for approximate encryption with respect to the Hilbert-Schmidt norm and the operator norm has been studied by Kerenidis and Nagaj [9] . They show that key length is quite sensitive to the norm chosen to specify the security requirement.
In this article, we revisit approximate randomization with respect to the trace norm, which reflects most closely our ability to physically distinguish quantum states. We first observe that an explicit scheme of Ambainis and Smith may be improved by using an optimal construction of small-bias spaces due to Alon, Goldreich, Håstad, and Peralta [3] . This reduces the key size to n + 2 log 1 ǫ + 4, and avoids the need for ciphertext that is longer than the original message. This construction avoids another rather subtle issue. The length-preserving schemes suggested in Ref. [5] require that the two communicating parties agree on a prime number of length Θ(n). Since there is no known polynomial-time deterministic procedure to generate a prime number of a specified length, additional communication is required to establish this shared prime number. (The prime may be generated locally by one party by a randomized procedure.) The encryption and decryption procedures we suggest require a common irreducible polynomial over GF(2) of degree Θ(n), which may be computed independently by the two parties using an efficient deterministic algorithm due to Shoup [15] .
Next, we investigate collections of unitary operators that give rise to approximately randomizing maps. We show by a probabilistic argument that any sequence of
unitary operators chosen independently from a perfectly randomizing set with high probability defines an approximately randomizing map for d-dimensional quantum states.
A simple rank argument shows that at least d(1 − ǫ 2 ) unitary operators are always needed, for approximate encryption in d dimensions. No better lower bound is known. Methods for showing lower bounds for perfect encryption all fail, since they crucially rely on the property of completely randomizing maps to destroy all quantum correlation between the encrypted state and any state previously entangled to it.
We take a different approach, and derive necessary conditions on distributions over Pauli operators that correspond to approximately randomizing maps. These conditions are similar to notions such as "almost n-wise independence" in the theory of pseudorandom distributions (see, e.g., Ref. [11] ). As a corollary, we get a tighter lower bound on randomizing sets of Pauli operators in the regime of exponentially small ǫ.
We describe our results more formally in the following two subsections, and then prove them in the remaining sections.
Preliminaries
We refer the reader to the text [13] or the lecture notes [14] for definitions of basic concepts in quantum information.
Let L(H) denote the space of linear operators on the Hilbert space H. This includes the cone of positive semi-definite operators (density operators) on H. Let U(H) denote the set of unitary linear operators on the Hilbert space H.
We say that R is completely randomizing if ǫ = 0. We will mainly discuss randomization with respect to the trace norm. For any linear operator M ∈ L(C d ), the trace norm is defined by M tr = Tr √ M † M . Equivalently, it is the sum of the singular values of M , and therefore also referred to as the "1-norm". The trace norm is arguably a more appropriate measure of distinguishability in the context of eavesdropping, since it is directly related to information that measurements reveal about quantum states. We will also use the Frobenius (or Hilbert-Schmidt) norm in our proofs. This norm is defined as M F = Tr(M † M ). Since this is the ℓ 2 norm of the vector of singular values of M , this is also referred to as the "2-norm" by some authors.
Randomizing maps are easy to construct. For example, the map R : ρ → Tr(ρ) I d is completely randomizing. However, these maps are most useful when they can be inverted by a quantum operation to recover the original state, as is required in the case of encryption.
The protocols for encryption we study involve two parties, labeled Alice and Bob, who share a secret, uniformly random bit-string, called the private key k. Alice wishes to send a d-dimensional quantum state ρ to Bob. She would like to apply an invertible quantum operation [12] to the state, and send it to Bob so that when averaged over k, the map is randomizing. This would ensure that no eavesdropper be able to distinguish two different messages with non-trivial probability. Such protocols have also been called "private quantum channels" by some authors (see, e.g., Ref. [4] ). We have implicitly assumed that the quantum channel is noiseless unless an eavesdropper tampers with it. Therefore Bob, who also has the key k, can apply the inverse operation to decrypt the message ρ perfectly.
A natural way to create such an invertible randomizing operator is to select a sequence of unitary operators U 1 , . . . , U m and define
Here, the index i corresponds to the shared secret key held by the communicating parties, and is unknown to any eavesdropper. With a suitable choice of unitary operators the map R would be ǫ-randomizing. In fact, any orthogonal set of unitary operations on C d , such as the set of d 2 Pauli operators, form a completely randomizing map [6] .
The most general one-way encryption scheme may in addition involve an ancilla that depends upon the key [12] :
This is slightly more general than the form claimed in Ref. [4] . However, the results in the latter article extend to the more general maps above (see also Ref. [8] ). This general form of encryption uses more qubits in the ciphertext than originally present in the message, which is undesirable from an efficiency point of view. We will only study randomizing maps as in equation (1), which correspond to encryption without ancilla.
The randomizing maps we construct will involve the Pauli operators. We will denote the Pauli operators on a single qubit by I, X, Y, Z:
These operators are unitary, Hermitian, and they square to the identity. The non-identity Pauli matrices anti-commute with other non-identity Pauli matrices. For example, XY = −YX. Where the overall phase of 'i' is irrelevant, we will substitute Y with the matrix XZ.
For two n-bit strings a, b, let |a ∧ b| = n j=1 a j b j . We will often represent a tensor product of n single qubit Pauli operators by a string of 2n bits (a, b) ∈ {0, 1} 2n using the correspondence
and Z b is defined similarly. Let P n denote the set i |a∧b| X a Z b : (a, b) ∈ {0, 1} 2n of all tensor products of n single qubit Pauli operators.
For two n-bit strings a, b ∈ {0, 1} n , considered as elements of GF (2) n , the standard scalar product is defined A distribution p over {0, 1} 2n defines a CPTP map on n qubits via the above bijection:
We will study randomizing maps of this form more closely. A special case is when p is uniformly distributed over a set S ⊂ {0, 1} 2n . In this case, we will denote the associated CPTP map by R S .
The single qubit Pauli operators P 1 form an orthogonal basis for L(C 2 ) under the inner product (A, B) = Tr(B † A). The set P n of 2 2n tensor products of n such Pauli operators similarly form an orthogonal basis for L(C 2 n ). There are also bases of d 2 orthogonal unitary operators on L(C d ) for general dimension d (that is not a power of 2).
We will also make use of the concept of a stabilizer state [13, Section 10.5.1, page 454]. A stabilizer group G is an abelian group generated by a subset T ⊂ P n of the Pauli operators on n qubits. Each stabilizer group G defines a linear subspace C G of C 2 n which is the common +1-eigenspace of all the Pauli operators in G. If G is generated by k independent Pauli operators, and does not contain −I, then the linear subspace C G has dimension 2 n−k . By a stabilizer state, we will mean a pure state which spans the one dimensional subspace C G stabilized by a group G of order 2 n .
Every stabilizer group generated by k independent Pauli matrices may be specified by listing its generators row-wise in a k × 2n boolean matrix M via the bijection in equation (2) . Since the generators all commute, different rows of the matrix have symplectic inner product 0 with each other. For a 2n-bit vector w = (u, v), let M ·w denote the k-bit vector obtained by taking the symplectic inner product of the k rows of M with w.
Statement of Results
The problem we address in this paper is the construction of approximately randomizing maps which preserve the number of qubits in the message.
First, in Section 2, we describe an an explicit construction for a sequence of unitaries that approximately randomize. This construction combines the work of Refs. [5, 3, 15] to give an improvement over the explicit construction by Ambainis and Smith [5] . 
is ǫ-randomizing with respect to the trace norm. The sequence of Pauli operators defining U i may be determined from the index i in timeÕ((log m) 4 ) =Õ(n 4 ).
Remark 1.3 The notationÕ(T ) above suppresses factors poly-logarithmic in T . Since there is an lineartime completely randomizing map consisting of a sequence of d 2 unitary operators, the above theorem is only useful when
. We were therefore able to assume that log m = log d+2 log
Next, we study which sequences of unitary operations are suitable for approximate encryption. In Section 3, we prove that almost all sequences of O( 
and R is ǫ-randomizing with respect to the trace norm, with probability at least 1 − e −d/2 . Each unitary operation U i may be chosen independently from an arbitrary distribution over U(C d ) that gives rise to a completely randomizing map.
In the above theorem, each unitary in the sequence may be chosen independently according to an arbitrary completely randomizing distribution of unitaries, not necessarily the same for each i. For instance, it may be chosen according to the Haar measure on U(C d ), or the uniform distribution over any orthogonal unitary basis for U(C d ). For the case that ρ is an n-qubit state, the unitary operators can be chosen from among the Pauli operators, which are particularly simple operators.
Theorem 1.4 is in general incomparable to Theorem II.2 of Hayden et al. [7] . Our theorem reduces by a factor of log d the number of unitaries required for approximate encryption in the trace norm. However, it does not imply the stronger bound of ǫ/d with respect to the spectral norm ("∞-norm") on the distance from the completely mixed state, even with a log d factor more unitaries.
We conjecture that the construction of the approximately randomizing map in Theorem 1.2 is optimal in the use of secret key bits, up to an additive constant. We are unable to establish this rigorously at present, but take some steps towards this.
We derive conditions on distributions over {0, 1} 2n that define randomizing maps. These conditions are similar in flavour to other notions of pseudo-randomness such as "almost k-wise independence". We believe these will help prove the optimality of our constructions. Theorem 1.5 Let R p be a CPTP map on n qubits induced by a distribution p over {0, 1}
2n , as in equation (3) . Let V be the random variable corresponding to p. If R p is an ǫ-randomizing map with respect to the trace norm, then the random variable M · V is ǫ-close to the uniform distribution over {0, 1} n in ℓ 1 distance for every n × 2n matrix M over GF(2) that defines a stabilizer state.
As a corollary, we prove that any distribution corresponding to an ǫ randomizing map (with respect to the trace norm) is necessarily ǫ-biased (cf. Definition 2.1 in Section 2). This implies a new lower bound on the number of bits of key in the regime of extremely small ǫ, when it is smaller than 2 −n/2 . 
An explicit randomizing set
In this section, we prove Theorem 1.2. We describe an explicit sequence of unitary (Pauli) operators that are approximately randomizing. The i-th unitary in the sequence can be determined from the index i in polynomial time. To obtain this result, we use the connection made by Ambainis and Smith [5] between randomizing maps and small-bias spaces, together with a more efficient construction of such spaces due to Alon, Goldreich, Håstad, and Peralta [3] .
Recall that the Pauli operators form an orthogonal basis for matrices, so we may express any density matrix over n qubits as
where α = (α M ) is a vector in C 2n with α 2 2 ≤ 2 n . The component α I /2 n of any quantum state along the identity operator is exactly 1/d = 1/2 n . If a CPTP map E is completely randomizing, then
Thus, the map annihilates all the non-identity components of the state. The idea behind the construction for approximate randomization is to construct a map that shrinks the non-identity components of a density matrix sufficiently, so that it becomes close to completely mixed. Such a map may be constructed from small-bias sets.
Definition 2.1 (Naor and Naor [11] ) The bias of a subset S ⊂ {0, 1} k with respect to a string u ∈ {0, 1} k is defined as
where the expectation is taken over strings x chosen uniformly at random from S, and u, x = i u i x i (mod 2) is the standard scalar product over GF (2) .
The subset S ⊂ {0, 1} k is said to be δ-biased if the bias with respect to every non-zero string is bounded by δ:
This definition extends to arbitrary distributions p over {0, 1} k in the natural way:
where the random variable X is distributed according to p, and p is said to be δ-biased if its bias with respect to every non-zero string u is bounded by δ.
The bias with respect to a string u is the bias of the XOR (exclusive OR) of the bits selected by the string u, i.e., the difference of the probabilities that this XOR is 0 or 1. The set of all strings has bias zero, and small-bias spaces are more efficient substitutes for this set.
Recall from equation (3) in Section 1.2 that a subset of strings S ⊂ {0, 1} 2n defines a CPTP map on n qubits as follows:
If we choose S = {0, 1} 2n , we get a completely randomizing map. Ambainis and Smith showed that if we choose S to be a δ-biased set, then the operator R S scales every non-identity Pauli operator by a factor at most δ. We then get an ǫ-randomizing map by setting δ to be suitably small, namely, ǫ · 2 −n/2 .
Proposition 2.1 (Ambainis and Smith [5]) Let S ⊂ {0, 1}
2n be a set with bias at most ǫ/2 n/2 . Then the map R S as defined in equation (4) is an ǫ-randomizing map with respect to the trace norm for n-qubit states.
For completeness, we give a proof of this proposition in Appendix A.
We now use an optimal construction of δ-biased sets to get our randomizing map. Proposition 2.2 (Alon, Goldreich, Håstad, Peralta [3] ) Let r, s be positive integers. There is a subset S ⊂ {0, 1}
rs , of size 2 2r , with bias at most s 2 r . Given a monic irreducible polynomial of degree r over GF (2) , and an index 1 ≤ i ≤ rs, the i-th string in S may be constructed with O(rs) multiplications in GF(2 r ), and a further r 2 s bit operations.
We describe this construction in Appendix B.
For our purposes, we need r, s such that the length of the strings is 2n, and the bias of the set S is at most ǫ · 2 −n/2 . In other words,
Solving for the smallest such r, we get that the length of key 2r is at most 2r ≤ n + 2 log 1 ǫ + 4 .
So a δ-biased set of size m = 2 2r ≤ 16 · 2 n /ǫ 2 with δ ≤ ǫ · 2 −n/2 exists. This gives us an ǫ-randomizing map R S with m unitary operations, corresponding to a key length of 2r, as above.
Since a completely randomizing map exists with 2 2n unitaries, we may assume that ǫ ≥ 2 −n/2 in our construction. In other words, we may assume that r ≤ n.
Given a key of length 2r, and an irreducible polynomial of degree r over GF(2), the associated tensor product of single qubit Pauli operators may be computed with O(rs) = O(n) multiplications in GF(2 r ), and a further O(r 2 s) = O(n 2 ) bit operations. Multiplication in GF(2 r ) can be implemented with O(r log r) = O(n log n) bit operations (see, e.g., Theorem 8.7 and its corollary on page 288, Chapter 8, in Ref. [1] ). The bit-complexity of these computations is therefore O(n 2 log n). Furthermore, a monic irreducible polynomial of degree r over GF(2) may be computed by a deterministic algorithm that takesÕ(r 4 ) bit operations [15, page 40, Theorem 3.6]. Thus, this part of the construction dominates the time complexity, which is in effectÕ(n 4 ). These observations conclude the proof of Theorem 1.2.
The abundance of randomizing maps
In this section, we prove Theorem 1.4, which states that there is a plethora of randomizing maps that use essentially the same number of bits of key as in the explicit construction. We use a probabilistic argument that is similar in structure to that of Hayden et al. [7] . To show that m unitaries suffice, we first show that a sequence of m random unitary operations approximately randomize any fixed state with high probability. To extend the approximate randomizing property to all states, we show that it suffices to randomize a set of finitely many pure states that in a certain precise sense approximately cover the unit sphere in C d . Finally, a "union bound" shows that with probability exponentially close to 1 every state is approximately randomized.
In our argument, each unitary operator is independently distributed according to the Haar measure, or any other distribution over unitary operations corresponding to a completely randomizing map. In particular, the operators could be chosen uniformly at random from an orthogonal basis for L(C 2 n ), such as the Pauli basis P n .
Proof: (of Theorem 1.4) Consider a sequence of m unitaries {U i } independently chosen from a measure µ i on U(C d ). We require that the measure µ i give us a completely randomizing map. For any density matrix ρ ∈ L(C d ), and U distributed according to µ i ,
The sequence {U i } define the map
Fix a pure state ρ ∈ L(C d ). We first bound the expected distance of R(ρ) from the completely mixed state I/d. Define the random variable Y ρ as follows
While we may carry out a similar analysis for a mixed state ρ, it is sufficient (and also simpler) to restrict ourselves to pure states; cf. Remark 1.1.
Proof: From Corollary A.2, we have
By the definition of Frobenius norm,
Here, we have used the linearity of the trace function, and the fact that Tr(σ 2 ) = 1 for any pure state density matrix σ.
Recall that the unitary operators U i are chosen randomly according to a measure µ i satisfying equation (5). Taking expectation over the random choice of unitaries, we get
In equation (8), we used the fact that U i and U j are chosen independently according to measures µ i , µ j .
Putting equations (6) and (9) together gives us
Thus, the random sequence of unitary operators {U i } randomizes any fixed state ρ very well in expectation, provided m is chosen suitably larger than d.
We now note that the function f ρ (U 1 , U 2 , . . . , U m ) defining the random variable Y ρ has bounded difference.
In other words, if we replace any one of the unitaries U i by another unitaryŨ i , the function value changes by a small amount. Denote the randomizing map given by the modified sequence
byR. Then, we have
By the triangle inequality
The McDiarmid bound from probability theory states that any random variable with such a bounded difference property is concentrated around its mean. 
whenever the vectors x and x ′ differ only in the k-th coordinate. Let Y = f (X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X m ) be the corresponding random variable. Then for any t ≥ 0,
Theorem 3.2, along with equation (11) immediately implies that for any fixed pure state
This implies, using our bound from Proposition (3.1) on the expected value of Y ρ ,
The probability that R(ρ) deviates from the completely mixed state decays exponentially in its distance, and the number of unitary operators m. We would like to extend this property to all pure states. For this, it suffices to randomize a suitably large, but finite, set of pure states (a "net") given by the following proposition (see, e.g. Ref. [7] for a proof). . By the triangle inequality, and the unitary equivalence of the trace norm, it is straightforward to show that
We can now bound the probability that the map R fails to randomize some pure state.
By the union bound, for the worst case stateρ
if η is chosen to be at most ǫ/3, and m at least 
Towards proving optimality
The best known lower bound for an ǫ-randomizing map R with respect to the trace norm, defined by a distribution over unitary maps on n qubits, is n + log(1 − ǫ 2 ). This follows directly from a rank argument: consider the image of a pure state. It has rank at most m, the number of unitary matrices defining R. The distance of any rank m density matrix from the completely mixed state I/2 n is at least 2(1 − m · 2 −n ). Since R is ǫ-randomizing, this distance is at most ǫ, and the bound on the number of bits of key, which is log m, follows.
The above lower bound does not reflect the amount of key required to achieve better security, as ǫ → 0. (At ǫ = 0, the optimal number of key bits is 2n.) To get stronger bounds, we focus on the simplest and perhaps most natural maps, those defined by distributions of Pauli operators, as in equation (3).
Recall that the n-qubit Pauli operators are in one-to-one correspondence with the set {0, 1}
2n , and we may therefore study distributions on this set instead. We derive conditions on these distributions (stated in Theorem 1.5) which we believe will help prove the optimality of our constructions. As a corollary, we prove that any distribution corresponding to an ǫ randomizing map (with respect to the trace norm) is necessarily ǫ-biased (cf. Definition 2.1). This implies a new lower bound on the number of bits of key. The bound makes the strong dependence of key length on the parameter ǫ explicit, while sacrificing the strong dependence on message length n.
In Theorem 1.5, we stated constraints on distributions over Pauli matrices that are randomizing. We prove these constraints here by considering the action of randomizing maps on stabilizer states.
Proof: (of Theorem 1.5) Let |ψ be an n-qubit (pure) stabilizer state, stabilized by a group whose n generators are given by the set T . We claim that for any Pauli operator P , the state P |ψ is either parallel to |ψ or orthogonal to it.
If P commutes with every Pauli operator in T , then P |ψ is also stabilized by T : For g ∈ T , we have gP |ψ = P g|ψ = P |ψ . Since the linear subspace stabilized by T is one-dimensional, P |ψ belongs the linear span of |ψ . If P anticommutes with some g ∈ T , then ψ|P |ψ = ψ|P g|ψ = − ψ|gP |ψ = − ψ|P |ψ = 0.
It follows that for any two Pauli operators P, Q, the states P |ψ and Q|ψ are either parallel or orthogonalwe use the matrix P Q = P † Q in the above argument. In fact, we can say something stronger. Let M be the n × 2n matrix representation of the generator set T . The states P |ψ and Q|ψ are parallel iff M · w = M · w ′ , where w and w ′ are the 2n-bit representations of the Pauli operators P and Q, respectively, and M · z is the vector of symplectic inner products of the rows of M with z. This is because
which is equivalent to saying that P Q commutes with the stabilizer.
Let |ψ x be a canonical pure state in the linear span of P |ψ , where P is any Pauli matrix such that M ·w = x, and w ∈ {0, 1} 2n represents P . Since the n generators in T are independent, the matrix M has rank n. Therefore, the image of set {0, 1}
2n under M is all of {0, 1} n , the states |ψ x are well-defined as x ranges in {0, 1} n , and they form an orthonormal basis for C 2 n . Now consider a randomizing map R p specified by a distribution p over {0, 1} 2n , and its action on the stabilizer state |ψ . We use ψ, ψ x , etc. as shorthand for the density matrices |ψ ψ|, |ψ x ψ x |, etc.
This mixed state is diagonal in the basis {|ψ x }, and therefore its trace distance from the completely mixed state is
where V is the random variable corresponding to the distribution p. Since R p is ǫ-randomizing, the above expression is bounded by ǫ. This is precisely the ℓ 1 distance of the random variable M · V from uniform on n-bits.
These conditions imposed by on distributions over Pauli matrices are similar to conditions such as "almost k-wise independence" (see, e.g., Ref. [11] ), but are not equivalent to any of the standard notions of pseudorandomness. As claimed in Corollary 1.6, it is however a stronger notion than that of having bias at most ǫ.
We finish with a proof of this corollary, which also gives us a stronger lower bound for the key size for exponentially small ǫ.
Proof: (of Corollary 1.6) Consider any non-zero string w ∈ {0, 1} 2n . Let w = (u, v), where u, v ∈ {0, 1} n .
We would like to show that the random bit w, V has bias at most ǫ, where V is the random variable corresponding to the distribution p.
We first prove this property for w such that for each i = 1, . . . , n, at least one of u i , v i is 1. Consider n stabilizer generators, the i-th one g i defined as g i = n j=1 P j , where P j = I for all j = i, and P i is equal to
These n generators {g i } commute and are independent, and therefore specify a pure stabilizer state. This state is a tensor product of n single qubit Pauli eigenvectors,
depending upon whether the i-th generator g i has Z, X, or Y, respectively, in its i-th tensor factor.
For i = 1, . . . , n, let e i be the n-bit string which is zero in all positions except the i-th. Then the 2n-bit string representing the generator g i is g i ↔ ( e i , v e i , e i , u e i ).
Consider the action of the map R p on this stabilizer state. From Theorem 1.5, we get that the random variable M · V is ǫ close to uniform on n-bits, where M is the matrix representing the stabilizer {g i }. Its rows are given by the equation (13) . Note that M · V is the sequence of n bits u i V i + v i V n+i (mod 2). Any distribution that is ǫ close to uniform in ℓ 1 -norm is also ǫ-biased. Therefore, the XOR of the bits in M · V has bias at most ǫ. The XOR is precisely the scalar product (u, v), V = w, V , so we have proven the first part of the claim for strings w of the type described above.
For an arbitrary non-zero string w = (u, v), we consider a string w ′ = (u ′ , v) such that u ′ i = 1 for all i such that u i = v i = 0, and u ′ i = u i for the remaining i. From the argument above, we have that M ′ · V is close to uniform, where M ′ is defined by the string w ′ . The scalar product w, V is the XOR of a subset of the bits in M ′ · V . Therefore its bias is also at most ǫ.
When p is uniform over a subset S ⊂ {0, 1} 2n , we get that the set is ǫ-biased, and the stated lower bound on its size is given in Ref. 
B A construction of small bias sets
In this section, we present the construction described in Proposition 2.2 of small-bias spaces due to Alon, Goldreich, Håstad, and Peralta [3, Section 5] (see the remarks at the end of the Section 5 in the reference). This construction is optimal in the regime of extremely small biases that we are interested in. Let r, s be positive integers. We would like to identify a set S ⊂ {0, 1} rs of size 2 2r and with bias at most s2 −r . We construct S by describing a string s xy for each pair of string x, y ∈ {0, 1} r . We identify both x and y with elements of the vector space GF(2 r ) over the field GF(2) in the natural way. Let {e i }, i ∈ [r] = {0, 1, . . . , r − 1} be a basis for the vector space GF(2 r ).
We define the string s xy bit-by-bit. For i ∈ [r], j ∈ [s], the (i, j)-th bit of s xy is given by e i x j , y . All multiplications in the expression e i x j are in the field GF (2 r ), and ·, · is the standard scalar product in GF(2). The string s xy is thus given by the following array of bits:
e 0 , y e 0 x, y · · · e 0 x s−1 , y e 1 , y e 1 x, y · · · e 1 x s−1 , y . . . Note that computing all the rs bits of s xy takes O(rs) multiplications in GF(2 r ), and a further O(r 2 s) bit operations to compute scalar products.
It only remains to argue that the bias of the set S = {s xy } so constructed has bias at most s2 −r . u ij e i   x j is a polynomial in x with coefficients in GF(2 r ) and with degree at most s − 1. Since u is non-zero, and {e i } are linearly independent, the polynomial p u is not identically 0.
The bias of S with respect to u is then given by bias(S, u) = |1 − 2 E xy u, s xy | This finishes the description of the small bias set in Proposition 2.2.
